Blinder calls it on the bogus debt debate

In a long overdue op-ed piece in the WSJ (sorry, it is behind their pay wall), Dr Blinder calls the popular myths in the debt debate. First, he points out that the American Public is really wooly about exactly what they mean by deficit reduction that everybody claims they really, really want. Research has suggested that deficit is a long ways behind jobs on people’s worry list. Even on the deficit, when pushed, the public picks on foreign aid as a means to cut the deficit.

Second, the more pernicious myth that the deficit is so bad that we need to cut everything right now. Witness the statements out of Congress yesterday as they continued to posture on raising the debt ceiling. When investors around the world are willing to pay us to hold their debt, we should borrow more, not less – in the short term.

Which leads us to the third myth – that deficits over the next ten years matters, As Dr Blinder points out, it just is not true. What really matters is what happens over the next 20 – 50 years. If we don’t do it right, come 2040, deficit could be nearly one-fifth of GDP and that is twice where Greece is now. That is definitely not a good place to be.

And therein lies myth number 4 – we have a current spending problem. No we don’t. We have a future commitment problem specifically in health care expenses, primarily Medicare. As Dr Blinder points out, CBO projections show that by 2050 (as reliable as projections that far out may be…) ex-health care, primary deficit actually reduces as a percentage of GDP. Health care increases by 6.6% (of GDP) but overall primary deficit only increases by 6% – meaning other contributors to the deficit are actually shrinking.

So what should we do?

As Dr Blinder and Dr Krugman have been crying for some time now – we should borrow and invest in good ol’ US of A. If we can borrow 500 bln now and ‘pay’ it over the next 20 years by dropping the deficit by about 5 trln – it would be a wonderful return on investment.

Somehow, I don’t think we will do it.

Posted in Macro Economics | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

The Greek Tragedy

We are willing to bet that Donald Trump is smiling.

Trump was the first to prove the maxim – if you owe the bank 100 dollars, the bank owns you. If you owe them a 100 million, you own the bank.

What Greece should do is to exit the Euro and re-issue its debt in drachmas. That would instantly devalue the drachma and effectively create a market clearing haircut on its debt. Problem is, this will make it awfully tempting for Italy and Spain to follow suit. Effectively, this will blow up the Euro.

Welcome to the Nuclear Option.

What Greece wants to do is to get bailed out, but without the attached austerity measures. Papandrieu’s action in calling for a referendum was a brilliant tactical move.

Checkmate.

It is clear that the lenders will accept the 50% haircut and roll over Greek debt. After all, that is infinitely better than getting nothing back. It is also clear that the austerity measures are simply punishments being visited on Greece for its transgressions in the past. No serious economist actually believes that the austerity measures will really help improve the Greek economy, especially in the short term. What Greece needs right now is to roll over its current debt and have all future debt issued at rates appropriate to the risk – closer to the 20% implied by CDS. The only way that can happen is if the referendum succeeds.

The easiest way for the referendum to succeed (or the threat withdrawn) is for the lenders to drop the austerity requirement while keeping the rest of the deal alive. That is what we would bet on happening.

Posted in Macro Economics | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Take our money… Please

The Wall Street Journal is reporting today that Treasury is considering issuing short term paper with negative yields. In a survey of its primary dealers, itfound that at least some of its dealers were willing.

The story is behind the pay wall, but the following is a direct quote:

“Negative-yield bidding is a great idea, and the Treasury Department should have considered this a few years ago,” said Scott Sherman, interest-rate strategist in New York at Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, a primary dealer, who answered affirmatively to the question regarding the negative-yield bid question.

Just to make sure we are all on the same page here: a nominal negative yield security would give back less at maturity than what you paid for it. In practical terms, you would buy a 3 month T-bill that pays zero interest for $101 and get back $100 at maturity, thereby locking in a $1 loss.

My friend, the Sage Investor has argued forcefully that we are about to get hammered from too much debt. To quote:

The main theme behind social fears is the simple fact that there is an unsustainable, overwhelming amount of debt in the world. It is too many multiples of global GDP to be sustainable. The only way to correct this overshoot of credit is for the markets to collapse and reset. All asset prices will deflate when credit shrinks. Please keep in mind the following excerpt from a recent post. This concept is paramount.

And yet, here you have folks lining up to lend at a predetermined loss. How come?

I think the Sage is looking at debt a little too rationally. In a rational world, he is absolutely correct: too much debt MUST result in delevering and that inevitably leads to deflation. But I don’t think we are living in a rational world.

We are living in a world that accepts current cashflows for perfectly uncertain future payments.

Consider the ways in which we have made current cash flows more important than future recovery:

  1. Mortgages used to be for 10 years. They then went to 15, 20, 30 and briefly during the mad days of 2002 – 2005, an incredible 40 years. What was that except an attempt to alter present cash flows by kicking the principal repayment can down the road?
  2. Duration extension of the Barclay’s Index (formerly Lehman Index). Ten years ago, the duration of the index was about 4.25. Today it is out around 5.67 for corporates. Aside from technical factors, issuance has become more long dated
  3. Presence of CDO and CDO squared and synthetics. These are products that serve no purpose other than to convert long term payment promise into short term cash flows.
  4. The Greek Tragedy. This whole exercise has been to find a way to kick the Greek debt can down the road while saving face.
  5. What this tells me is that the financial world is happy to push bond maturities out into the future in exchange for current cash.

    But shouldn’t that mean the exact opposite: Shouldn’t people be demanding high rates of current return from the Treasury especially if they believed that Treasury default from too much debt was inevitable?

    Logically, that should be the case. But as a practical matter we see that people are willing to lend to the US government with no expectation of return. That tells me that they are incredibly pessimistic about a recovery, at least in the short term. It also tells me that the market does not believe for an instant that the US Government would actually default. It also means that they expect the Stock and Bond markets to have a negative total return over the next three months.

    So, I think the Sage is wrong – not on the logic, but his faith in the rationality of markets. I am comfortable in the argument that a world which thinks that Greece can get out of this with anything other than a clean default is a very irrational one.

    That world is very capable of extending debt into the infinite future and pretending that things are A-OK and we will simply grow our way out of this with no deflation. By the time the 100 year bond comes up for maturity, I will be long dead, so why not?

Posted in Macro Economics, Portfolio Strategy | Tagged | 1 Comment

Bond ‘God’ doubles down

Bill Gross who is widely regarded as the authority on bonds and bond markets is doing what every gambler with other people’s money does: when down, double your bets.

After being burned by a poorly timed bearish bet on treasuries, he is now swinging for the fences with a bullish bet on long dated treasuries. Naturally, that bet needs to be matched by being bullish on mortgages.

At least he is consistent.

But he is still playing with fire. However, since the losses will go to his investors who have placed a mind blowing $1.2 trillion under his (presumably) divinely guided hands, he really has very little to lose.

To the faithful readers of this page (all two of them), this just reinforces what we have always said: the current models that are widely used to predict market behavior are just wrong. They make assumptions that bear no resemblance to reality. They bet on those assumptions and end up losing other peoples money.

Turns out even Mr Gross is just guessing.

Who’da thunk it?

Posted in Portfolio Strategy | Leave a comment

Chutzpa

The wags have it that chutzpa is the kid who killed his parents and asked the judge for mercy because he was an orphan.

Well, HP ( NYSE:HPQ) hasn’t killed anybody. Yet. But as the WSJ reports, they have hired Goldman Sachs to help them ‘defend’ themselves from activist shareholders.

Let’s read that one slowly. One more time.

H-P is using shareholder money to hire Goldman Sachs to protect themselves from shareholders. Goldman, of course, will gladly take H-P’s money, while simultaneously crapping on their stock. Because that’s how they roll.

H-P seems to have a thing for candidates for Governor. After firing Carly Fiorina, they have now hired her rival in the governor’s race – Meg Whitman. Whitman’s claim to fame is that she bought Skype for 4.1bln in 2005 and sold it four years later for 2.75 bln. Not bad for four years at the helm. Carly’s claim to fame at H-P was her purchase of Compaq, which Meg now wants to sell.

Meg Whitman is paid a salary of $1 at H-P but shed no tears: the La Times reports that none of them will be hurting.

I love me some Capitalism!

Posted in shrill | Tagged , | Leave a comment

AUM: the mantra for the East and the West

Wikipedia describes the mystical chant of the East AUM, as follows:

“AUM” is the reflection of the absolute reality, it is said to be “Adi Anadi”, without beginning or the end and embracing all that exists.[3] The mantra “AUM” is the name of God, the vibration of the Supreme. When taken letter by letter, A-U-M represents the divine energy (Shakti) united in its three elementary aspects: Bhrahma Shakti (creation), Vishnu Shakti (preservation) and Shiva Shakti (liberation, and/or destruction).[3]

I don’t know much about the creation of the Universe and Eastern mysticism. But AUM, in a different form is clearly the mantra for the West, especially Wall Street.

Imagine it is 2006 and you and your neighbor have $10,000 to invest. You could invest it in the broad stock market – say, Vanguard Total Market ETF (symbol: VTI) or you could invest it with Fidelity Magellan Fund (FMAGX).

You choose the Magellan Fund while your neighbor went with VTI. Fast forward to to-day. How would you have done compared to your neighbor?

His 10,000 dollars would have become 10,719. Your 10,000 would have turned into 9,385 – a difference of $1335 or 13% of your original investment. In other words, your neighbor is 13% better off than you are over the same period.

You gave your money to the active management skills of Harry Lange. In those 5 years, he managed to make you 13% worse than your neighbor. Along the way, he made several million dollars in compensation for his efforts at making you 13% poorer than your neighbor.

Harry Lange was fired yesterday – but only from his position of Portfolio Manager. Fidelity is ‘looking for other opportunities for him’.

This magic is made possible by the mystical AUM – Assets Under Management. Fidelity charged 0.6% of the total assets under management as fees. Each year, Fidelity Magellan Fund alone, based simply on its current 14 billion size, created $84 million in fees – which was largely divvied up between its various ‘star’ managers.

So, you lost 13%, he made several millions off your money.

Why does this model of compensating Portfolio Managers still survive?

Posted in Portfolio Strategy, shrill | Tagged | 1 Comment

The Emperor is dead! Long live the Emperor

Unless the ECB (and Germany) agree to lay aside their righteous anger at deficit financing and take clear action to defend Greece and Italy, the Euro is coming apart at the seams.

Ordinarily I would argue that may be a good thing, but a disorderly unwinding of the euro would create massive chaos and send gold skyrocketing. Along with gold would go US Treasury and Japanese Yen.

As an interesting side note, the Chinese are sitting on the sidelines and watching this unfold, primarily because they know that US Treasuries are the safe haven currency and they hold an awful lot of it. But the joke will be on them if the Euro falls apart – a worldwide recession will stop China in its tracks and you don’t stop an engine that big suddenly without some really bad effects.

I think it is too late to reverse the damage in Europe. Curiously enough, it is the bond vigilantes who are taking Greece down – but for the opposite reason than what the deficit scolds had been arguing for. Every major Euro nation is in the grip of ‘Austerity’ and the resulting economic stagnation is destroying faith in their sovereign debt. As Krugman points out, unless the ECB starts buying Euro debt, Greece is bound to default.

Posted in Macro Economics, shrill | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Crying Wolf

Martin Wolf of the Financial Times points out the obvious on what the bond markets are telling us: Take our money, Please. (and spend it).

He makes an interesting point:

As Richard Koo of Nomura Research has argued, fiscal deficits help the private sector deleverage.

I think that is exactly right. The markets have also showed us that the private sector has been able to deleverage massively without a significant hit to their bottom lines. I am convinced that was largely due to the demand being kept up – artificially – by the various QEs and by the stimulus package – inadequate as that was.

Unfortunately, his advice will fall on deaf ears in the White House. By all indications, the big jobs idea due to come out of the White House tomorrow is about $150 bln in continued payroll tax breaks and another 150 bln in extension of unemployment benefits. Unless there is a bold statement that we will increase our deficits and spend it on boosting employment this will have no impact on the upcoming recession. But Obama is so cowed by the deficit scolds that he is not going to propose anything of that sort tomorrow.

We may get lucky and avoid a recession, but I don’t think so. I expect that we are currently in a recession and the data will show it in January 2012.

Posted in Macro Economics, shrill | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Thinking Golden thoughts

What is the fair value for gold?

Traditionally, value is assigned either by present value of future cash flows or by cost plus profit. But gold has no future cash flows that it generates. That leaves the only logical method to determine fair value of gold as the cost plus approach.

It is not always easy to estimate the cost of producing gold. As this CNBC article illustrates, the raw cost of production ranges from zero to $650 depending on who you ask. Throw in other costs like depreciation etc and it hovers between $300 and $1000.

I am sceptical about the $1000 cost simply because gold has really not traded near $1000 for very long (relatively speaking) which means these producers were running their operations at mammoth losses. I am reminded of Hollywood accounting for movie profits.

Assuming the production cost of gold is about $600, what is its fair value?

The simple answer is, there isn’t one. There is no natural ceiling for gold prices – it is driven entirely by fear. Nor is there a natural floor (other than, of course, zero). The demand / supply equation for gold is also very distorted since the ornamental value of gold is a matter of perception – Indians generally are disdainful of anything less than 22 carat gold while most westerners are quite happy with 14 carat gold.

At the end of the day, I tend to ignore all predictions of gold prices – and all claims of it being over or undervalued. Buy it if you think everybody else is going to be afraid of the economy.

Posted in Portfolio Strategy | Tagged , | Leave a comment

From the ‘this is a really bad idea’ department….

CNBC is running a story that argues that if the markets want a Eurobond, the only way they are going to force Merkel’s hand is by creating a Lehman like crisis.

Like Paulson in the autumn of 2008, selling a shock-and-awe response domestically could be a lot easier in the face of a major crisis.

Paulson now admits to what many of us had known all along: the US Congress was not going to agree to a multi-billion dollar bailout of the US banking industry without something to really, really scare them. Ergo, Lehman had to go by the wayside. As Naomi Klein documents so presciently in Shock Doctrine, this is now capitalism’s modus operandi – gin up a disaster and use it to get policy action that would otherwise be impossible to achieve.

Why is this such a terrible idea? Firstly, disasters (whether ginned up or naturally occurring) tend to be extraordinarily destructive. The destruction is often completely random. Secondly, no one has the smarts, even the Masters of the Universe (who, oddly enough, all seem to work on Wall Street…) can predict the collateral damage – for Lehman, one particular collateral damage was billions of dollars lost to money managers who used Lehman as a prime broker.

Now that the idea is ‘out there’ that we need a disaster to force Merkel’s hand (who we cheered a couple of days ago for displaying a spine) is it possible that a spectacular failure is in the cards for Europe? Far fetched as it may seem, I wouldn’t exactly rule it out. I would actually not be surprised to see a run on Italy’s bonds as the most vulnerable to pressure.

Posted in Macro Economics, shrill | Tagged , | Leave a comment