The shot across the bow

Wall Street Journal reports that GM is pulling its ads from Facebook complaining that the ads have not translated into revenue for GM.

Buried in the story are a variety of other advertisers simply arguing the same point: we are not seeing any proof that facebook advertising is translating into increased sales.

Regular readers of this humble blog (both of them) know that we are not fans of Facebook the $100 billion company.

But more importantly, we fail to see why the “eyeballs = revenue” model that failed so spectacularly for AOL, Yahoo, AskJeeves and a host of others – with Google being the lone exception – should suddenly work for Facebook. Google provides a service – a search engine for those looking to buy something. There is money to be made in directing a motivated eyeball to your website.

But Facebook is not associated with shopping – it is essentially a gossip site, water-cooler stuff. We are simply unconvinced that the average internet shopper is going to get to his website through FaceBook when Google and Bing are around.

If our premise is correct, then FaceBook, forever, will remain a gossip site. The only logical source of revenue for FaceBook is a subscription service where its 900 million users pay a small sum each month to be a facebook user. But how many of the 900 million would be willing to do that?

We are completely convinced that ad revenue will NOT support any service on the web unless it is a service that (mostly) attracts people looking to buy stuff.

From that premise, FaceBook is a non-starter as an investment.

For those who are salivating over the 650 milion or so FaceBook users – remember that in its heyday, AOL claimed an astounding 70% of all Internet use.

Sadly, the frenzy for FaceBook shares has been carefully orchestrated by the underwriters to make sure that the individual investor who gets in is almost sure to be burned. Consider this poor sap:

“I’ll buy the stock just to see what happens,” Cuy said. “To a lot of people around the world, Facebook is the Internet, so I’d love to grab a few shares the first day it goes public. Plus, I can show them off to my friends and impress people.”

Why don’t you just burn your cash instead? We are sure more people will be impressed by you burning currency.

The WSJ also reports similar stories

Across the nation in El Cajon, Calif., technology teacher and investment-club supervisor Todd Benrud is trying to get his club at Grossmont High School into Facebook stock. “They use Facebook every day,” Mr. Benrud said. Some students think it is “guaranteed to make money.”

Our advice to Mr Benrud’s students: get a different investment club supervisor.

We see no way for long term investors to make money on FaceBook in like, ever.

UPDATE: here are some companies(Market cap) that FaceBook supposedly is worth more than:

  • Abbot Labs (97B)
  • Unilever (93B)
  • Cisco (89B)
  • Schlumberger (87B)
  • Disney (81B)
  • Home Depot (74B)
  • Caterpillar (60B)
  • 3M (60B)

… and my favorite, Berkshire Hathaway (86B)

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Double Jeopardy

I’ll take Derivative Bets for a billion Alex

A few random thoughts on this one.

The size of the loss indicates that some limit went horribly wrong somewhere

Fixed income desks (should) never operate without limits. Never. In happier times they went with simple limits based on duration, convexity and tracking error and in the case of CDS, notional. Then came the ‘sophisticated’ models such as Bank of America’s Lighthouse model that claimed to be able to calculate VaR for a CDS portfolio. We have always been skeptical of VaR models for anything other than the most liquid, most easily valued asset classes – stocks and currencies. It is a stretch to try and calculate VaR for a bond portfolio, leave alone for a bond derivative.

So was JPM using VaR limits to manage the CDS portfolio? If so, what other positions are at greater risk than thought because the ‘faulty’ VaR model said so? One would expect that there are other shoes to drop.

The direction of the bet is interesting

We don’t know all the facts yet, but from what we do know, it looks like the bet was in CDS space. There are really only two places that offer the kind of liquidity to trade the kind of notional values that would be needed to generate a $2B loss – Euro sovereign and US corporate.

If it was a Euro sovereign bet, then it is essentially what MF Global did – bet on a Greek sovereign default and then double down when it did not happen. If it was on US corporates, it was likely in high yield space simply because that is where the juice is. Since CDS spreads have generally been tightening over the past few months, a bet that lost this kind of money would have to have been on spreads widening and sharply at that. That would mean that against all public wisdom, the JPM trader has been shorting the bond market.

Interesting.

Clearly the VaR model screwed up

Looks like Mr Dimon said as much on the talk shows yesterday. Which brings us to the other interesting question – exactly what is the model validation process at JPM? If it is like that at JPM, one of the better managed firms, what is it like at Morgan Stanley? BofAMerrill?

What was the counterparty risk here?

A 2 billion realized loss in CDS space is 2 billion in counterparty mark-to-market before the swaps were unwound / settled. How many players were on the other side of this position? If I am CSFB and had 10% of this overall position, my MtM with JPM was $200MM on this one trade. Which brings me to the inherent problem of setting counterparty limits and CSA thresholds. If I am CSFB, I have no idea what my counterparty is on the hook for with others on this same trade. In theory, that should affect how much I am willing to go in for, but in practice I cannot do that. Dodd-Frank, if properly implemented would have made that possible by forcing CDS trades out of OTC space. Which brings us to…

more than the Volcker Rule, we need to bring CDS out into the open

Krugman makes the case for the Volcker rule forcefully today. But I think the bigger problem is elsewhere.

I have privately and semi publicly railed against the opacity of the CDS market. My first comment to the best boss I ever had, at GE (Rob MacDougall) was that I don’t like the bond market with OTC CDS because I have no clue how much the debt has been synthetically multiplied. I have no way of developing a notion of who else might be at risk in a corporate bankruptcy because of their CDS position on that name.

That was the case in 2002 and is the case 10 years later.

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The trouble with models

A recent story in the WSJ talked about the pitfalls of investing in exotic derivatives tied to even more exotic underlying securities.

The basic story is how an Exchange Traded Note (ETN) that would be expected to mimic the VIX, actually does not. To quote the article:

On the surface, exchange-traded notes, widely known as ETNs, appear similar to exchange-traded funds, which trade like stocks on an exchange. But the inner workings of ETNs are more complicated. An ETN doesn’t actually hold any underlying investment as an exchange-traded fund, or ETF, would. Instead, an ETN is contractual agreement by the issuer to pay shareholders returns equal to the investments it is designed to track.

Adding to complexity of this situation, the Credit Suisse ETN is linked to the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, or VIX. That index, which is based on options prices, can experience wild swings. The Credit Suisse ETN is designed to magnify that volatility; investors make or lose twice as much as the daily move in the VIX.

I wrote an article back in 2010 describing how ignoring the assumptions embedded in the models for a seemingly simple derivative, such as the CDS, almost led to the total collapse of the financial system.

I constantly remind myself of Dr Feynman’s words as a participant in the Rogers commission investigating the Challenger disaster:

When using a mathematical model careful attention must be given to uncertainties in the model.

.
Wise words to live by.

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Insta-Insanity

News Item:

Mobile application purchased for US$1 Billion.

No, that is not a typo, it is a Billion with a B.

The application has 30 million registered users. The company that owns the application has a dozen employees and no revenues. Last week, the company closed funding for $50 million for a 10% stake – valuing the company at $500 million. Today, it is (apparently) worth double that.

The seller is a mobile app called Instagram. It is a way to share photos quickly across the web – primarily from twitter. The buyer is, Facebook.

Who said that the Internet bubble burst in 2000?

Facebook itself is a very interesting company from a valuation point of view. The company has 640 million users and had revenues of $3.1 billion last year.

Typical price to sales ratio of well run companies hover around 1.5 – ie, its market value is approximately equal to one-and-a-half times its total revenue. GE had revenues of $140 billion last year, its valuation is about $200 billion. IBM: Price-to-sales of about 1.8. Internet behemoth Google has a price to sales ratio of about 4. Apple, supposedly the best value in the world today has a price-to-sales ratio of about 4.5

There is popular talk that Facebook, when it IPOs in a month will be valued at $100 billion. That would give it an eye-popping price-to-sales ratio of 33.

In order for it to justify a $100 billion valuation at a price-to-sales ratio of about 4 (Google / Apple levels), its revenues must rise eightfold.

Facebook has 640 million users. Facebook has to have 8 times as many users as it has now – or about 5.2 BILLION users.

That means that fully 70% of every man, woman and child in the world must become Facebook users AND generate the same level of revenue as current users for it to justify a valuation similar to Apple or Google.

That’s right: 7 out of every man woman and child in China and India and sub-saharan Africa – people who are surviving on under a couple of hundred dollars a year, must get access to computers, Facebook and become targets for advertisers.

Or advertisers must be willing to shell out 8 times as much money as they are currently paying for Facebook users eyeballs.

And Facebook just paid out 1% of its ‘potential’ market cap to a company with zero revenues whose 30 million users are probably already Facebook users.

This cannot end well for Investors who buy Facebook IPO at $100billion valuation.

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Winning the Intertubes – the CNBC edition

One expects lunacy in the Intertubes. One just doesn’t expect it to get a prominent position at CNBC.

This article took a prominent spot on CNBC’s headline page a few days ago. Here is the lead:

Warning: This article may cause you to a punch a hole in your drywall.

In 2002, if you had purchased Apple stock instead of putting the same amount of money into a house, you’d have almost $10 million right now.

That’s based on analysis by TradeMonster.com co-founder Jon Najarian, who took various common assets purchased in our lifetime, like a house, and priced them in Apple terms.

The lunacy in this approach is simply staggering. This is what happens when Hindsight Bias marries Survivorship Bias and they have a child.

In April 2002, when Apple was selling for $11 and change – the following investment options were also available: Cisco ($17.62), Microsoft ($30.19), JDS Uniphase ($47.12), Yahoo ($18.93), Amazon ($16.35).

With $200,000 to spend, how would you have invested your money instead of buying a house? That question is so foolish that I cannot even begin to sputter out an answer.

It is completely insane to compare a potential investment in a stock with unknown future to a home purchase.

And yet, by all accounts Jon Najarian is a very successful pundit.

Go figure.

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Blinder calls it on the bogus debt debate

In a long overdue op-ed piece in the WSJ (sorry, it is behind their pay wall), Dr Blinder calls the popular myths in the debt debate. First, he points out that the American Public is really wooly about exactly what they mean by deficit reduction that everybody claims they really, really want. Research has suggested that deficit is a long ways behind jobs on people’s worry list. Even on the deficit, when pushed, the public picks on foreign aid as a means to cut the deficit.

Second, the more pernicious myth that the deficit is so bad that we need to cut everything right now. Witness the statements out of Congress yesterday as they continued to posture on raising the debt ceiling. When investors around the world are willing to pay us to hold their debt, we should borrow more, not less – in the short term.

Which leads us to the third myth – that deficits over the next ten years matters, As Dr Blinder points out, it just is not true. What really matters is what happens over the next 20 – 50 years. If we don’t do it right, come 2040, deficit could be nearly one-fifth of GDP and that is twice where Greece is now. That is definitely not a good place to be.

And therein lies myth number 4 – we have a current spending problem. No we don’t. We have a future commitment problem specifically in health care expenses, primarily Medicare. As Dr Blinder points out, CBO projections show that by 2050 (as reliable as projections that far out may be…) ex-health care, primary deficit actually reduces as a percentage of GDP. Health care increases by 6.6% (of GDP) but overall primary deficit only increases by 6% – meaning other contributors to the deficit are actually shrinking.

So what should we do?

As Dr Blinder and Dr Krugman have been crying for some time now – we should borrow and invest in good ol’ US of A. If we can borrow 500 bln now and ‘pay’ it over the next 20 years by dropping the deficit by about 5 trln – it would be a wonderful return on investment.

Somehow, I don’t think we will do it.

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The Greek Tragedy

We are willing to bet that Donald Trump is smiling.

Trump was the first to prove the maxim – if you owe the bank 100 dollars, the bank owns you. If you owe them a 100 million, you own the bank.

What Greece should do is to exit the Euro and re-issue its debt in drachmas. That would instantly devalue the drachma and effectively create a market clearing haircut on its debt. Problem is, this will make it awfully tempting for Italy and Spain to follow suit. Effectively, this will blow up the Euro.

Welcome to the Nuclear Option.

What Greece wants to do is to get bailed out, but without the attached austerity measures. Papandrieu’s action in calling for a referendum was a brilliant tactical move.

Checkmate.

It is clear that the lenders will accept the 50% haircut and roll over Greek debt. After all, that is infinitely better than getting nothing back. It is also clear that the austerity measures are simply punishments being visited on Greece for its transgressions in the past. No serious economist actually believes that the austerity measures will really help improve the Greek economy, especially in the short term. What Greece needs right now is to roll over its current debt and have all future debt issued at rates appropriate to the risk – closer to the 20% implied by CDS. The only way that can happen is if the referendum succeeds.

The easiest way for the referendum to succeed (or the threat withdrawn) is for the lenders to drop the austerity requirement while keeping the rest of the deal alive. That is what we would bet on happening.

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Take our money… Please

The Wall Street Journal is reporting today that Treasury is considering issuing short term paper with negative yields. In a survey of its primary dealers, itfound that at least some of its dealers were willing.

The story is behind the pay wall, but the following is a direct quote:

“Negative-yield bidding is a great idea, and the Treasury Department should have considered this a few years ago,” said Scott Sherman, interest-rate strategist in New York at Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC, a primary dealer, who answered affirmatively to the question regarding the negative-yield bid question.

Just to make sure we are all on the same page here: a nominal negative yield security would give back less at maturity than what you paid for it. In practical terms, you would buy a 3 month T-bill that pays zero interest for $101 and get back $100 at maturity, thereby locking in a $1 loss.

My friend, the Sage Investor has argued forcefully that we are about to get hammered from too much debt. To quote:

The main theme behind social fears is the simple fact that there is an unsustainable, overwhelming amount of debt in the world. It is too many multiples of global GDP to be sustainable. The only way to correct this overshoot of credit is for the markets to collapse and reset. All asset prices will deflate when credit shrinks. Please keep in mind the following excerpt from a recent post. This concept is paramount.

And yet, here you have folks lining up to lend at a predetermined loss. How come?

I think the Sage is looking at debt a little too rationally. In a rational world, he is absolutely correct: too much debt MUST result in delevering and that inevitably leads to deflation. But I don’t think we are living in a rational world.

We are living in a world that accepts current cashflows for perfectly uncertain future payments.

Consider the ways in which we have made current cash flows more important than future recovery:

  1. Mortgages used to be for 10 years. They then went to 15, 20, 30 and briefly during the mad days of 2002 – 2005, an incredible 40 years. What was that except an attempt to alter present cash flows by kicking the principal repayment can down the road?
  2. Duration extension of the Barclay’s Index (formerly Lehman Index). Ten years ago, the duration of the index was about 4.25. Today it is out around 5.67 for corporates. Aside from technical factors, issuance has become more long dated
  3. Presence of CDO and CDO squared and synthetics. These are products that serve no purpose other than to convert long term payment promise into short term cash flows.
  4. The Greek Tragedy. This whole exercise has been to find a way to kick the Greek debt can down the road while saving face.
  5. What this tells me is that the financial world is happy to push bond maturities out into the future in exchange for current cash.

    But shouldn’t that mean the exact opposite: Shouldn’t people be demanding high rates of current return from the Treasury especially if they believed that Treasury default from too much debt was inevitable?

    Logically, that should be the case. But as a practical matter we see that people are willing to lend to the US government with no expectation of return. That tells me that they are incredibly pessimistic about a recovery, at least in the short term. It also tells me that the market does not believe for an instant that the US Government would actually default. It also means that they expect the Stock and Bond markets to have a negative total return over the next three months.

    So, I think the Sage is wrong – not on the logic, but his faith in the rationality of markets. I am comfortable in the argument that a world which thinks that Greece can get out of this with anything other than a clean default is a very irrational one.

    That world is very capable of extending debt into the infinite future and pretending that things are A-OK and we will simply grow our way out of this with no deflation. By the time the 100 year bond comes up for maturity, I will be long dead, so why not?

Posted in Macro Economics, Portfolio Strategy | Tagged | 1 Comment

Bond ‘God’ doubles down

Bill Gross who is widely regarded as the authority on bonds and bond markets is doing what every gambler with other people’s money does: when down, double your bets.

After being burned by a poorly timed bearish bet on treasuries, he is now swinging for the fences with a bullish bet on long dated treasuries. Naturally, that bet needs to be matched by being bullish on mortgages.

At least he is consistent.

But he is still playing with fire. However, since the losses will go to his investors who have placed a mind blowing $1.2 trillion under his (presumably) divinely guided hands, he really has very little to lose.

To the faithful readers of this page (all two of them), this just reinforces what we have always said: the current models that are widely used to predict market behavior are just wrong. They make assumptions that bear no resemblance to reality. They bet on those assumptions and end up losing other peoples money.

Turns out even Mr Gross is just guessing.

Who’da thunk it?

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Chutzpa

The wags have it that chutzpa is the kid who killed his parents and asked the judge for mercy because he was an orphan.

Well, HP ( NYSE:HPQ) hasn’t killed anybody. Yet. But as the WSJ reports, they have hired Goldman Sachs to help them ‘defend’ themselves from activist shareholders.

Let’s read that one slowly. One more time.

H-P is using shareholder money to hire Goldman Sachs to protect themselves from shareholders. Goldman, of course, will gladly take H-P’s money, while simultaneously crapping on their stock. Because that’s how they roll.

H-P seems to have a thing for candidates for Governor. After firing Carly Fiorina, they have now hired her rival in the governor’s race – Meg Whitman. Whitman’s claim to fame is that she bought Skype for 4.1bln in 2005 and sold it four years later for 2.75 bln. Not bad for four years at the helm. Carly’s claim to fame at H-P was her purchase of Compaq, which Meg now wants to sell.

Meg Whitman is paid a salary of $1 at H-P but shed no tears: the La Times reports that none of them will be hurting.

I love me some Capitalism!

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